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IBE CONCEPT OF LAW REVISITED
Leslie Green*
THE CONCEPT OF LAW. Second Edition. By H.L.A. Hart. With a
Postscript edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 315. $26.

Law is a social construction. It is a historically contingent feature of certain societies, one whose emergence is signaled by the
rise of a systematic form of social control and elite domination. In
one way it supersedes custom, in another it rests on it, for law is a
system of primary social rules that direct and appraise behavior,
together with secondary social rules that identify, change, and enforce the primary rules. Law may be beneficial, but only in some
contexts and always at a price, at the risk of grave injustice; our
appropriate attitude to it is therefore one of caution rather than
celebration. Law pretends, also, to an objectivity that it does not
have, for whatever judges may say, they in fact wield serious political power to create law. Not only is law therefore political, but so
is legal theory - there can be no pure theory of law; concepts
drawn from the law itself are inadequate to understand its nature.
Legal theory is thus neither the sole preserve, nor even the natural
habitat, of lawyers or law professors: it is just one part of a general
social and political theory. We need such a theory, not to help decide cases or defend clients, but to understand ourselves, our culture, and our institutions, and to promote serious moral assessment
of those institutions, an assessment that must always take into account the conflicting realities of life.
Those are the most important theses of the late H.L.A. Hart's
The Concept of Law, published originally in 1961. Like some other
great works of philosophy, however, Hart's book.is known as much
by rumor as by reading, so it will be unsurprising if, to some, that
does not sound like Hart at all. For what circulates as his views particularly, I am embarrassed to say, in law schools - is often
quite different. Isn't Hart the dreary positivist who holds that law is
a matter of rules that rest on a happy social consensus? Doesn't he
think that law is objective, a matter of fact? Doesn't Hart celebrate
the rule of law and take its rise as an achievement, a mark of pro* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Department of Philosophy, York
University, Toronto. B.A. 1978, Queen's University; M.Phil. 1980, M.A., D.Phil. 1984, Oxford. - Ed. I am grateful to Denise Reaume, Jeremy Waldron, and Wil Waluchow for discussion of a number of points.
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gress from "primitive" to modem society? Doesn't Hart think that
liberty and justice are possible only through the certainty that clear
law provides? And isn't his whole theoretical perspective straightjacketed by a disproved, or at least outmoded, distinction between
fact and value? Isn't Hart concerned more with semantics than
politics?
Between those conflicting readings of - maybe I should say
"attitudes toward" - Hart's book, there also lies a realm of consensus about the way The Concept of Law changed the direction of
Anglo-American legal theory. For one thing, it introduced and
clarified a set of questions that came to dominate the literature: Is
law always coercive? What are legal rules? Do judges have discretion? Is there a necessary connection between law and morality?
Hart also coined the idiom in which we debate the answers to such
questions: "the practice theory of rules," "the internal and the external point of view," "primary and secondary rules," "the rule of
recognition," "core and penumbra," "content-independent reasons," "social and critical morality." These terms and distinctions
are now part of cultural literacy for legal theorists writing in
English.
How then can there be such a wide divergence in views about
Hart's theory, such confusion about his central claims? It is impossible to put it down to style. Hart is a clear and honest writer:
every technical term is purchased in the coin of necessity; the occasional obscurity of language is never a cover for shallowness of
thought; humor and irony he uses to lighten, not conceal. In part, it
may just be that the Zeitgeist has moved on.
The Concept of Law is a book of its time. The book's language,
examples, and method rest in England and, more specifically, Oxford of the fifties. 1 Here I want to try to bridge the gap not only, as
I have done in the opening paragraph, by connecting Hart's concerns with some more recent ones, but also by reexamining the 1961
work in light of some themes in its newly published Postscript.2
The second edition of The Concept of Law consists of the original text together with a reply to critics that Hart left unfinished at
the time of his death in 1992. The editors, Penelope Bulloch and
Joseph Raz, have done an invaluable job of preparing this Post1. Contrary to what often is said, however, the book is not an exercise in linguistic philosophy - though Hart was influenced by linguistic philosophy and, in his book with TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN TiiE LAW (1959), demonstrated his facility with it.
2. As Hart advised the student:
In the case of any important jurist, it is frequently profitable to defer consideration of
the question whether his statements about law are literally true or false, and to examine
first, the detailed reasons given by him in support of his statements and, secondly, the
conception or theory of law which his statement is designed to displace.
P. 277.
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script for publication. Two parts were projected by Hart. The first,
published here, is mainly a reply to the criticisms of Ronald
Dworkin. The second, which never got beyond fragmentary notes,
sought to counter other critics - Raz among them, no doubt who, Hart concedes, found points of "incoherence and contradiction" in his work (p. 239). Hart chose to add a postscript, rather
than revise the text of the book, because, as the editors note, he
"did not wish to tinker with the text whose influence has been so
great."3
It is not, of course, as if Hart waited thirty years to reply to his
critics. He was a lively polemicist, and the points of refinement in
this Postscript are less significant than a number of the essays he
published after The Concept of Law. 4 The Postscript brings no major surprises or recantations, and some of Hart's responses to
Dworkin are already well-established in the literature: there is no
categorical distinction to be drawn between legal rules and principles (pp. 260-63); principles can be comprehended in the rule of
recognition (pp. 265-66); judges do exercise discretion, even when
they carry forward by analogical construction the underlying spirit
of the law, for at some point a choice among analogies cannot be
avoided (p. 275); and positivist legal theory has never been a matter
of semantics (pp. 245-47). Here, I want to focus on some other
points, in particular some of Hart's last thoughts about rules,
power, the connection between law and morality, and about the nature of legal theory, for there we find some of the most enduring
themes, and problems, of his work.

I.

LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

A. Antinaturalism and Antiessentialism

Constructivism is now wildly popular in the social studies, where
the term has expanded to refer to almost any antirealist, antiessentialist, or antideterminist view of social life.5 Some of this argument
is substantively idle, for it challenges no descriptive or normative
thesis about its objects. If everything of interest is a social construe3. P. vii. It is too bad that the publisher did not share fully Hart's view, for the new
edition of this widely cited classic has inexplicably been repaginated, so that the legal theorist's professional tools are now a copy of the first edition, together with a photocopy of the
new Postscript.
4. Most of these are reprinted in his EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
(1983). Attention also should be drawn to Natural Rights: Bentham and Mill, Legal Duty
and Obligation, and Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, all in his EssAYS ON BENTIIAM (1982); and to his brief Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(R. Gavison ed., 1987).
5. For some typical discussions see DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1989) or FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein ed., 1990).
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tion, if there is no unconstructed reality, then nothing follows from
claiming that something is a social construction. Race is a social
construction; and so are racism, poverty, and bullets. This might
sound like a potent theory, but it is not. It is like being told that
God does not exist, only to find out that the interlocutor does not
believe in the existence of dogs either. Once we lose the terms of
implied contrast and everything is on an ontological par, there is no
critical bite to the claim.
At a lesser level of generality, constructivism sometimes simply
amounts to the thesis that the object in question has a history.
Here, we need to distinguish the claim that our discourse about an
object has a history from the claim that the object itself does. (That
the word "electron" was invented in 1890 does not suffice to show
that electrons were.) The significance of constructivism about our
objects of inquiry depends on whether anyone might deny the latter
thesis. It is trivial to speak of the social construction of intolerance,
as it is undeniably obvious that tolerance and intolerance are matters of human thought and practice. It is more interesting to speak
of the social construction of race, because many people still believe
that the classification of people into races is a natural one, and constructivism challenges that belief. The most potent forms of constructivism are thus those that promise to surprise us with the news
that a certain object of attention owes its very existence to social
history. 6
·
Should we thrill to hear that law is a social construction? If that
is just a consequence of the general thesis that everything is constructed, or that the word "law" is, then we more profitably may
pass on to other business. If it is the claim that law is a phenomenon with a history, then we will have at the very least a challenge to
certain arguments that associate law with reason out of time, with
what P.F. Strawson once called the core of human thought that has
no history.7 Some forms of ancient and medieval natural law theory might then be under threat. For example, no longer could we
say, with Cicero, that
[t]rue law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal
application, unchanging and everlasting . . . . We cannot be freed
6. Ian Hacking, one of the most sophisticated constructivists, puts it this way:
I respect someone who can argue that quarks are socially constructed: this is a daring
and provocative thesis that makes us think. I feel a certain guarded admiration when a
fact whose discovery was rewarded with a Nobel Prize for medicine is described as the
social construction of a scientific fact; anyone who shares my respect and admiration for
fundamental science has to sit up take notice. I do not find it similarly thrilling to read
about the social construction of events that could occur only historically, only in the
context of a society.
IAN H4CKING, REWRITING THE Sour.: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND SCIENCES OF MEMORY

67 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
7. See P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS 10 (1959).
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from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be
different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in
the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all
nations and all times ....s

But even if there exists such a timeless and universal natural moral
law, practically everyone agrees that human law, our law, has a history, that it is a product of human thought and practice. Naturalisms denying that are very much out of fashion among theorists though some judges have been known to flirt with them when they
run out of arguments.
Hart's theory places law firmly in history. According to him,
that there is law at all follows wholly from the development of
human society, a development that is intelligible to us, and the content of particular legal systems is a consequence of what people in
history have said and done. Moreover, he maintains that even the
normativity of law, its action-guiding and action-appraising character, is a social construction to be understood as a function of people's actions and their critical reactions to the behavior of others.
For Hart, however, this is all part of the specific nature of law; it is
not merely a consequence of some form of general philosophical
nominalism. He theorizes law as a social construction, but it is one
that emerges in a field of unconstructed reality including even certain unconstructed constraints of the human condition (p. 192).
It is tempting to see Hart's constructivism simply as a reflection
of his positivism; but that would be wrong, for one of the most sophisticated positivists, and one whose influence on Hart was significant, denied parts of the constructivist thesis. Hans Kelsen held
that law is a system of norms, which are not historical things at all.9
Kelsen did think that jurisprudence should restrict its attention to
positive law - human law rather than natural law - but he did not
study law under its empirical aspects. Rather, he proposed to study
it as a system of norms that, according to Kelsen, exists only if it is
valid. "Validity," in tum, entails bindingness, in other words, that
people ought to behave as the norms require. Historical facts such as the fact that someone said this, or ordered that, or was disposed to behave thus - can never validate norms, for an "ought"
cannot be derived from an "is." The reason for the validity of a
norm can be only another norm, and thus the ultimate reason for
the validity of law must be a norm rather than a matter of fact. This
"transcendental-logical presupposition" Kelsen called the
Grundnorm. 10 So while Kelsen is a positivist - law may have any
8. CICERO, DE RE PuBUCA III.xxii.33 (T.E. Page et al. eds. & Clinton Walker Keyes
trans., 1928).
9. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-205 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
10. See id. at 201.
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content and there is no necessary connection between law and morality - he is not a social constructivist. For Kelsen, law-as-norms
is not really part of the social realm at all, and the tools with which
we study historically situated norms - sociology, psychology, political theory, economics, etc. - are for him all "alien elements" that
lead only to the "adulteration" of a pure theory of law. 11
For Hart, in contrast, law is a social construction in two senses of
the term. First, law has a history. It is an institution that did not
always exist, that emerged for special reasons, and that takes the
form it does, including its normative character, only as a result of
human action. In fact, law is a social construction of social constructions, not of brute facts but of institutional facts - namely,
rules comprised by social practice and enforced by social pressure. 12
Second, Hart's resulting concept of law is antiessentialist: Though
there are central cases of legal systems, and central features of
those cases, there are also borderline cases and analogical cases
when without impropriety we still may speak of law.13 For Hart,
there is no essence to the phenomena we call "law" and, although
legal theory is right to strive to understand law's central features,
knowing these will not give us the key to all the sound generalizations about legal systems. There is no essence of law, the understanding of which can replace the hard historical, sociological, or, if
you like, genealogical task of explaining law as a social phenomenon. Thus, although the term would be foreign to him, there is no
coherent way for a legal theory to be more constructivist than
Hart's.
B. Law and Social Rules

One familiar hesitation about social constructivism and its attendant suggestion of constructing or building a reality is that it
sounds all too deliberate or voluntaristic. Gender is a social construction, some even say a performance, yet people sometimes feel
bullied and constrained by gender roles, and these roles often seem
to resist revision. Giving adequate weight to both agency and structure, to the willed and the unwilled, was one of Hart's major tasks
in replying to the classical positivists.
11. See id. at 1.
12. For a general account of the nesting of social facts, see JoHN SEARLE, THE CON·
STRUCilON OF SOCIAL REALITY 79-126 (1995).
13. Hart writes that:
The uncritical belief that if a general tenn (e.g. "law," "state," "nation," "crime,"
"good," "just") is correctly used, then the range of instances to which it is applied must
all share "common qualities" has been the source of much confusion. Much time and
ingenuity has been wasted in jurisprudence in the vain attempt to discover, for the purposes of definition, the common qualities which are, on this view, held to be the only
respectable reason for using the same word of many different things ....
P. 279.
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Laws, said Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and John Austin,
are expressions of will: they are the general commands of a sovereign.14 But as Hart saw, such a conception of law cannot explain
the variety of forms of law, nor how sovereigns can be bound by
their own rules, nor how law survives the death of the commander
(pp. 26-78). Above all, it cannot explain the normative character of
law, the fact that it purports to impose obligations on us (pp. 82-91).
A person's say-so has such normative power only when that person
somehow is authorized to make norms. Most sovereign bodies are,
of course, legally authorized to make law, but we need to explain
the laws authorizing the sovereign as much as any other law. So if
there is a norm, or norms, at the root of the legal system, it cannot
be a legal norm. Then what is it? Hart rejected Kelsen's theory of
the unconstructed, unsocial Grundnorm and its mysteries.15 Instead, he argued that fundamental lawmaking power rests on a customary social rule and has the kind of normative force that such
rules have. Law, Hart argued, is a union of social rules: primary
rules that guide behavior by imposing duties on people, and secondary rules that provide for the identification, ,change, and enforcement of the primary rules (pp. 90-99). Among the secondary rules,
the so-called rule of recognition has special importance. A customary practice of those whose role it is to identify and apply primary
rules, the rule of recognition provides ultimate criteria of legal validity by determining which acts create law. The rule of recognition
itself is neither valid nor invalid; it simply exists as a matter of social
fact or it does not. But when it does exist, and when people use it
as a standard for appraising behavior, then the language of validity
and invalidity comes to life, and a legal system is born.
What are these social rules of which law is constructed? Hart's
account, the "practice theory," holds that there is a rule among a
group P, whenever there is a regularity R in their behavior such
that: (1) most people in P conform to R; (2) lapses from conforming to R are criticized; (3) the criticism referred to in (2) is in
turn regarded as justified; and (4) R is treated as a standard for the
behavior of people in P. Rules are present when there is a certain
kind of social practice, regular behavior together with the set of
attitudes that Hart calls "acceptance" of the rule, which consists of
using it as a standard for one's own behavior and that of others.
Rules are to be identified and understood from the "internal point
of view," .the point of view of one who uses the rules as a standard,
14. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 311-35 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968); JEREMY
BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970); JOHN AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., 1995).
15. For Hart's objections see pp. 292-93, and the essays Ke/sen Visited and Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note
4.
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though of course from the "external point of view" they merely appear as behavioral regularities (pp. 88-91).
Whether we judge this account satisfactory depends on what we
expect of it. What is a "theory of rules" anyway? Here are some
things we might want to know about: What are rules? What is it to
follow a rule? What does it mean to say that a rule "exists"? What
is the relationship between rules and reasons for action? Hart's
theory does not answer all of these questions, perhaps because his
original ambitions were limited somewhat. He sought to distinguish
rules from other regularities of behavior, in particular from habits
and predictions; to explain, as a social matter, the binding force of
rules; and to set out the existence conditions for social rules. His
main dispute was with two forms of reductionism: the coercionbased theories of classical positivism, which conceived of rules as
orders backed by threats, and the behaviorist accounts influential
among legal realists, which conceived of rules as predictions of official action. Against these, Hart's arguments are decisive. So the
practice theory may be judged as a set of existence conditions for
social rules, as a test for the presence of rules, whether or not it
offers an analysis of rules or a full account of what it is to follow a
rule. A good set of existence conditions should tum up rules when
practiced, and not otherwise, but it need not itself tell us everything,
or even much, about the nature of rules any more than a litmus test
for the presence of an acid will tell us much about what acids are.
Hart's theory has, however, met with much criticism.1 6 There
seem to be rules that are not social practices (e.g., individual rules);
there are social practices that are not rules (e.g., certain common
openings in chess that are not among the rules of chess); and citing
a valid rule is often itself meant as a justification for one's behavior,
not merely a sign that there is some other acceptable justification
for it. The practice theory accommodates none of this. Moreover,
matters of duty and obligation - which according to Hart amount
to rules with a certain content17 that are enforced by serious social
pressure - in some cases appear not to depend on rules at all. One
certainly can believe that one has an obligation to save a drowning
person without believing there is a social practice of doing this, nor
even that there should be such a practice.
Dworkin argued against Hart that some rules are a matter of
concurrent practice when people converge for common reasons independent of their agreement, and that at best Hart's theory must
16. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 48-58 {1977); LESLIE
GREEN, THE AUTIIORITY OF THE STATE 44-49 (1988); JosEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON
AND NORMS 49-58 (1990).
17. They are believed important and may conflict with immediate self-interest. See pp.
86-87.
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be restricted to conventional practices, when the fact of agreement
in action is essential to the rule. 1s So, for example, it is a merely
conventional practice that in the United States people normally
drive on the right because it is a sufficient reason for conformity
that each expects everyone else to do the same. It is, however, a
concurrent practice that people refrain from torturing others; they
judge it wrong for reasons independent of what others are doing.
We might add another distinction: there are also coincidental practices that are agreement independent, when people· do the same
thing for different reasons.
Dworkin attempted to confine the practice theory to conventional rules and then argued that, even there, endemic controversy
about the scope of rules shows that duties must have another foundation. Conventional practice, he argued, never constitutes a normatively binding rule; it is relevant only because of the way it
expresses attitudes, gives rise to expectations, etc. that may figure in
the justifications for such rules. Dworkin thought that he thus had
proved that judicial duty cannot be limited to the scope of a practice rule.
In the Postscript, Hart accepts Dworkin's distinction and now
proposes to confine his theory to conventional rules only and to
abandon the rule-based explanation of all duties. He maintains,
however, that the practice theory gives a good account of conventional rules, including the rule of recognition, "which is in effect a
form of judicial customary rule existing only if it is accepted and
practiced in the law-identifying and law-applying operations of the
courts" (p. 256). There are no a priori limits, however, on the content of such a rule, and Hart suggests that Dworkin's holistic interpretive theory might be understood as "merely the specific form
taken in some legal systems by a conventional rule of recognition
whose existence and authority depend on its acceptance by the
courts" (p. 267).
There are a number of difficulties here. For one, the distinction
between conventional and concurrent reasons for conformity does
not map onto a distinction between two kinds of rules, for both
kinds of reasons may be present in one rule. Indeed, it is hard to
think of practiced rules that have only concurrent reasons for conformity: even a prohibition on murder must, at the margins, draw
certain conventional lines around the definition of murder. Hart
says that a rule is conventional provided "the general conformity of
a group to [it] is part of the reasons which its individual members
have for acceptance" (p. 255). To be "part of" the reasons for acceptance is a weak condition that is satisfied by all the mixed cases.
Indeed, in view of the fact that general conformity with law is a
18. See

DWORKIN,

supra note 16, at 53-58.
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public good, conventional reasons for conformity are normally
present. For example, even people who think considerations of justice a very good reason for treating the requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code as action-guiding typically conform their behavior to
it only if they believe most other people will too.
In these examples, concurrent reasons are present along with
conventional ones. Sometimes Hart seems to have something else
in mind. For example, .at one point he calls the rule of recognition
"a mere conventional rule accepted by the judges and lawyers of
particular legal systems" (p. 267). Is a rule a "mere" convention
only if there are no concurrent reasons for compliance? It seems
very unlikely that the rule of recognition is purely conventional; officials normally have moral views about the propriety of legislative
power. Yet Hart says:
Certainly the rule of recognition is treated in my book as resting on a
conventional form of judicial consensus. That it does so rest seems
quite clear at least in English and American law for surely an English
judge's reason for treating Parliament's legislation (or an American
judge's reason for treating the Constitution) as a source of law having
supremacy over other sources includes the fact that his judicial colleagues concur in this as their predecessors have done. [pp. 266-67]

Judicial recognition may, however, include that fact as a necessary
but insufficient condition, such that each judge recognizes the Constitution as supreme law only because other judges do too and also
because she for her part thinks that the Constitution is just. Hart
would say that this is possible, but not necessary, for acceptance of
a conventional rule can rest on anything whatever. He therefore
rejects not only Dworkin's claim that there must be good moral
grounds for doing what the rule says, but even the weaker thesis
that people must believe, rightly or wrongly, that there are good
moral grounds for doing what it says.
In the case of purely conventional rules, what motivates conformity? Despite Hart's suggestion that it may be anything
whatever, I think that it must rest on something like an overlapping
mutual interest19 and that the content of convention, contrary to
Dworkin, fulfills not a justificatory function, but the identificatory
function of showing which of the possible ways of conforming is the
one that will be practiced and thus serve that interest. People typically do, of course, have preferences among alternative common
ways of acting. They do not regard them all as equivalent and the
differences among them are often important; but if the rule is to be
purely conventional, then at some point these differences must
overwhelm the divergence of.interest. The worry, however, is that
when we come to fill out the idea of a mutual interest in conformity
19. See my Authority and Convention, 35 PHIL. Q. 329 (1985).
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we may end up without an obligation-imposing rule. It is odd to
think, for instance, that there is an obligation to eat with one's knife
in the right hand, even when it is conventional to do' so. In reducing
the rule of recognition to a purely conventional rule, Hart ends up
without an adequate account of its binding force, not even one consistent with his own theory of social obligation.
None of this has anything to do with any indeterminacy or controversiality of conventions; the problem arises even when they are
quite clear. In fact, as Hart says, indeterminacy and controversiality
are side issues. The idea that controversiality of some legal decisions disproves the existence of a generally accepted rule of
recognition
rests on a misunderstanding of the function of the rule. It assumes
that the rule is meant to determine completely the legal result in particular cases, so that any legal issue arising in any case could simply be
solved by mere appeal to the criteria or tests provided by the rule.
But this is a misconception: the function of the rule is to determine
only the general conditions which correct legal decisions must satisfy
in modem systems of law. [p. 258]

That is right, though it is put somewhat loosely, for whether a legal
decision is "correct" will depend on a great many things: whether
the judge can read English, follow logic, reason morally, and so
forth. The rule of recognition, at least as originally conceived by
Hart, did not purport to set any such conditions, generally or otherwise. It purported only to identify which of various social standards
are legally relevant - which are sources of law. Because these are
sources that judges are legally bound to apply, however, any analysis of the fundamental rules of a legal system still must be consistent
with their obligatory force. Unlike Kelsen and Dworkin, who are
on this point in agreement against him, Hart· is a social constructivist about obligation itself. But his view that the fundamental rules
are "mere conventions" continues to sit uneasily with· any notion of
obligation.
·
·

II.

CONSENSUS, DOMINATION, AND POWER

So law, for Hart, is socially constructed from rules, which are
themselves constructed from individual practice. That may sound,
to some, like a rather complacent and comfortable view of an institution that is an instrument of social control, for accepted social
rules are the sort of things that we ordinarily find in the discredited
"consensus" theories of the social functionalists and systems theorists. What about conflict and power?
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A. Hart's Whig History
It is unfortunate that Hart introduces his concept of law through
a somewhat wooden, fictional history of social development, tracking the change from what he sometimes calls a "primitive" form of
community based solely on rules of obligation to a different form of
social organization based on primary and secondary rules (pp. 9199). It is perhaps these passages more than any others that have
contributed to his undeserved reputation as an enthusiast of the
rule of law, for on a casual reading it seems like a Whig history of
progress, from primitive to modern, from custom to law. On this
reading, we begin with a primitive society in which social order rests
on a broad consensus about the so-called primary rules of obligation that are maintained by diffuse social pressure. But these societies are static, inefficient, and fraught with uncertainty. Law
emerges to - maybe even emerges in order to - cure these defects. Thus in a "developed," "complex" society things are better.
We gain certainty, dynamism, and efficiency through the introduction of rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. That is a
common reading, but it is mistaken, and the mistake easily can corrode one's understanding of Hart's theory. So let us take it more
slowly.
For Hart "primitive" here just means simple. The reason that
such societies do not have law is that they do not need it: nothing in
human nature or society requires that we have law; many people
have gotten along well without it (p. 91 ). A legal system, with its
institutionalized means of social control, is "not a necessity, but a
luxury" (p. 235). What then does Hart mean when he speaks of the
"defects" that the secondary rules cure? It is crucial to his argument that simpler forms of social order do work, but only in certain
contexts. He writes: "only a small community closely knit by ties
of kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable
environment, could live successfully by such a regime of unofficial
rules" (p. 92). Despite this real viability, "[i]n any other conditions
such a simple form of social control must prove defective and will
require supplementation in different ways" (p. 92; emphasis added).
It follows, then, that the "defects" that law "remedies" are not defects in simple, transparent forms of social order. They are, in a
sense, defects in us. These problems arise when we try to apply
those informal solutions native to a world of transparent solidarity
to our world, a world of few or repudiated kinship ties, in which
sentiments are not shared, in which the environment is a maelstrom
of change, where, as Marx says, "all that is solid melts into air."20
So Hart's targets here are not simple, transparent forms of social
20. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1872),
reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 476 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). For a
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order. It is the mistaken drive to apply techniques of governance
appropriate to those targets to a more opaque world of strangers the mistake of a Rousseau or of some modern communitarian political theory. It is also the mistake, I think, of Dworkin when he
suggests that political obligation may rest on fraternal "obligations
of community."21
It needs to be said, however, that Hart's discussion in these
pages is not exactly paralyzed with rigor. As many commentators
have noticed,22 his classification of rules as primary and secondary
is deployed here in a number of inconsistent ways: to mark a distinction of social importance (necessary vs. optional), of genesis
(first vs. later), of normative type (duty-imposing vs. power-conferring), and of object (rules about behavior vs. rules about rules).
These distinctions are neither the same nor extensionally equivalent
- they will carve up the territory in different ways. Moreover, it
seems unlikely there have existed societies that had rules of obligation, yet had no ways to create, extinguish, or vary such obligations.
Hart focuses on a simple regime that regulates "free use of violence, theft, and deception" (p. 91), but surely the human condition
also requires that any society find some way to regulate property
and kinship. That suggests that well before the emergence of the
systematizing rules of a legal order secondary rules in some of
Hart's senses already would have existed.
We can remedy this defect easily enough, and when we do so
Hart's theory clearly carries no significant bias in favor of modern
legal orders. Paradoxically, the bias more often lies with those who
detect in Hart's argument a form of modernist triumphalism, for
plainly what irks them about Hart's story is the thought that, if a
society lacks a legal system, then it lacks one of the achievements of
modernity - that it is uncivilized. Because it would be parochial
and demeaning to think "primitive" societies uncivilized, by modus
tollens, they must have legal systems. Hart's account, in failing to
acknowledge these as legal systems, therefore improperly must
favor modem or Western law. The logical form of this argument is
a bit startling, as it attempts to deduce an "is" from an "ought," but
quite apart from that it simply relies on a premise that Hart strenuously rejects: Law is not a mark of civility or justice, or anything of
the kind; it is just one way in which a complex society copes when
brilliant discussion of this theme, see MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT Is Soun MELTS INTO
AIR (1982).
21. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 190-216 (1986). I have criticized Dworkin's
attempt to derive the duty to obey the law from communal obligations in Associate Obligations and the State, in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY: THE ENO OF INDIVIDUALISM? 93-118 (A.
Hutchinson & L. Green eds., 1989).
22. See, e.g., C.F.H. Tapper, Powers and Secondary Rules of Change, in OXFORD EssAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ser. 242-77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
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the direct, transparent form of social order no longer works very
well.
B. Elite Domination
Hart argues against John Austin, who had a top-down, pyramidal view of law as the orders of a sovereign generally obeyed and
backed up by threats.2 3 It commonly is acknowledged that Austin's
was a crude theory, but some feel that it was at least realistic and
that Hart, while making positivism more subtle, also loses its punch.
For now law must rest, ultimately, on a form of social consensus,
and that idea obscures the ways in which law in fact is rooted in
social power.
Perhaps the most misunderstood part of Hart's view is the way
in which law is, and is not, related to social consensus. Dworkin
persistently has maintained, for example, that Hart cannot properly
explain the depth and nature of controversy about law .24 For Hart,
law may be controversial because it is a matter of open-textured
social rules that, though they have a "core" of settled meaning, also
have "penumbra!" areas of doubt in which the applicability of the
rule is, as a matter of practice, indeterminate (pp. 124-54). This is
as true of the rule of recognition as it is of any rule identified by it.
It too has a penumbra! area of discretionary judgment, unregulated
by law, but where decisions still may be appraised as better and
worse by other relevant standards, including those of critical
morality.
How much consensus does law in fact require? Many people
would accept something like Dworkin's precis of Hart's theory:
[T]he true grounds of law lie in the acceptance by the community as a
whole of a fundamental master rule (he calls this a "rule of recognition") .... For Austin the proposition that the speed limit in California is 55 is true just because the legislators who enacted that rule
happen to be in control there; for Hart it is true because the people of
California have accepted, and continue to accept, the scheme of authority in the state and national constitutions.25

The problem with that as a theory is obvious enough. First, it is
a fantasy: many people in California have no idea what the
"scheme of authority in the state and national constitutions"
amounts to. Some are not even aware that there is a state constitution, so the sense in which the community "accepts" it is pretty attenuated. Second, and worse, the "people of California" is an
abstraction, or a legal concept itself: the irrelevance of the attitudes
of those living in Tijuana is something that needs to be explained,
23. See AUSTIN, supra note 14.
24. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 3-11, 37-43;
25. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 34.

DWORKIN,

supra note 16, at 31-45.
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not assumed, by a theory of law. Beyond these two problems with
the theory suggested in that passage, however, there is also something wrong with it as an exposition of Hart, something worse than
mere imprecision.
Hart knew that the United Kingdom, for example, has power to
make law for Northern Ireland. He also understood that it would
be wrong to characterize this as a situation in which that latter community accepts the scheme of constitutional authority, for it is notorious that a large minority in Northern Ireland neither accepts, nor
acquiesces in, that authority. Indeed, if we take the notion of acceptance at all seriously it must be the case that general acceptance
of law's authority is pretty rare. Yet far from being an objection to
Hart's theory, this is an entailment of it.
The idea that the social foundations of law rest on "acceptance
by the community as a whole of a fundamental master rule" seriously distorts Hart's view. According to Hart, a regime of general
social consensus is what precedes a legal regime. Law has .a complex relation to conventional, customary rules, partly recognizing
them, partly replacing them. The existence of the rule of recognition explains why there is law in California, in Northern Ireland, or
in Quebec - a functioning legal system even though there is in
those jurisdictions no broad social consensus on the overall scheme
of authority. Hart writes:
In the simpler structure, since there are no officials, the rules must be
widely accepted as setting critical standards for the behavior of the
group. If, there, the internal point of view is not widely disseminated
there could not logically be any rules. But where there is a union of
primary and secondary rules, which is, as we have argued, the most
fruitful way of regarding a legal system, the acceptance of rules as
common standards for the group may be split off from the relatively
passive matter of the ordinary individual acquiescing in the rules by
obeying them for his part alone. In an extreme case the internal point
of view with its characteristic normative use of legal language ('This is
a valid rule') might be confined to the official world. In this more
complex system, only officials might accept and use the system's criteria of legal validity. The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there
is little reason for thinking that it could not exist or for denying it the
title of a legal system. [p. 117; emphasis added]

This passage illuminates one of the central ways that power relations emerge with law. Both social morality and custom, Hart
notes, are immune to deliberate change; they evolve only gradually
(p. 175). We almost might say that the emergence of law signals
that a society has acquired a new capacity deliberately to control its
common life, that, in a certain way, the community has come to
self-consciousness. Customs and norms now can be changed forthwith, by the say-so of the rulers, by majority vote, or whatever. The
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crucial fact is therefore institutionalization: the emergence of specialized organs with power to identify, alter, and enforce the social
rules. This "advance," however, brings both gains and costs: "[t]he
gains are those of adaptability to change, certainty, and efficiency,
and these are immense; the cost is the risk that the centrally organized power may well be used for the oppression of numbers with
whose support it can dispense, in a way that the simpler regime of
primary rules could not" (p. 202). These risks are real and sometimes have materialized. So, for Hart, the only consensus necessary
for law is a consensus of elites; that is a direct and potent consequence of the fact that law is an institutionalized normative system.
C.

Coercion and Power

While the institutionalization of law creates elites who may
come to dominate society, Hart also argues that law is not, of its
nature, coercive, at least not in the sense that all laws somehow
amount to coercive threats. Hart denies that it is possible to reduce
all power-conferring rules to sanction-prescribing rules (pp. 26-49).
One relatively unsophisticated form of such reductionism goes like
this: Rules empowering people to do things - e.g., to legislate, to
contract, to make wills, to marry, to amend a constitution - specify
ways in which these things must be done in order for the power to
be exercised validly. Failure to conform in the relevant ways means
that the purported exercise of power fails: the action in question is
a mere nullity; it lacks the legal effect it purports to have. But is
this nullity not essentially the same as the sanctions imposed by
criminal law? After all, nullity can be as inconvenient, distressing,
and expensive as some penalties.
Hart decisively campaigns against such reasoning (pp. 34-35).
First, the undesirability of nullity is purely contingent; it may sometimes be a benefit to find that, for example, a certain contract is
void. Second, and more important, the reductionist account falsifies the nature of power-conferring rules. In the case of a dutyimposing rule we can distinguish two different elements: the required standard of behavior (e.g., refrain from assault) and the reinforcing sanction (e.g., or else pay a fine or go to jail). These
elements, however, are not similarly present in the case of a powerconferring rule. For example, promises that are neither under seal
nor given for consideration are not something to be abstained from.
In so defining contractual powers, the law does not have it in mind
that people should either make .valid contracts or refrain from
promising. The provision failure to comply with which results in
nullity is not a separable part of the rule; it constitutes the rule itself. To the Kelsenian suggestion that they are fragments of rules
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that direct the courts to apply sanctions, Hart replies that this too
distorts the way law really works:
It is of course very important, if we are to understand the law, to see
how the courts administer it when they come to apply its sanctions.
But this should not lead us to think that all there is to understand is
what happens in courts. The principal functions of the law as a means
of social control are not to be seen in private litigation or prosecutions, which represent vital but still ancillary provisions for the failures of the system. It is to be seen in the diverse ways in which the
law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court. [p. 40]

This passage nicely illustrates Hart's contextual approach to
legal theory. There is no metaphysical answer to the question of
the individuation of laws. To understand the law is just to explicate
how power-conferring rules are used by those who use them: "Such
power-conferring rules are thought of, spoken of, and used in social
life differently from rules which impose duties, and they are valued
for different reasons. What other tests for difference in character
could there be?" (p. 41).
Those are certainly relevant considerations. But not only are
power-conferring rules valued for special reasons, sometimes they
also are feared and resented for special reasons. For Austin and
Kelsen, reductionism springs from the assumption that to have a
duty or obligation is to be subject, directly or indirectly, to coercion.
The salience of coercion in their theories is underwritten by the significance it plays in our lives: we normally seek to avoid it. To this,
Hart replies that coercion is real but secondary (pp. 199-200). First,
it is needed only when law fails in its primary task of giving standards for guiding and appraising behavior. Second, it is conceivable
that a legal system might not need coercive sanctions at all; their
presence in all actual, legal systems results not from the nature of
law but from the exigencies of human nature.
There is, I think, yet another reason for attending to the coercive character of law: it is the most dramatic way in which law exercises power over people. Some, though not all, laws are coercive;
but many more laws, though not coercive, are forms of social
power. That is true even of those power-conferring rules that Hart
generally refers to in a positive-sounding way as providing "facilities." Consider, for instance, the legal power to marry. It is granted
subject to conditions that, even in so-called liberal regimes, normally include the requirement that the union be concluded between
people of different sexes. Same-sex marriages are legal nullities.
Now, it would, for the sort of reasons Hart gives, be misguided to
think that what is going on here is a direct or indirect form of coercion, that people are being forced into the paradigmatic heterosexual union. There is, after all, no requirement to marry and, a
fortiori, no requirement to marry one of the opposite sex. In most
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jurisdictions it is not even wrong to purport to marry someone of
one's own sex, and no punishment is given one who purports to
conduct such a marriage; yet such marriages are null. There is, I
think, something important here, and one who fails to notice the
specific ways in which the legal system at this point embodies and
exercises power fails to notice something specific about legal regulation. Heterosexist marriage laws exercise power in different ways
from, say, criminal prohibitions on sodomy. The latter attempt to
guide people's behavior by removing options or rendering them infeasible. The marriage laws do not do that. While they do not remove anyone's options, they do give options to some and withhold
them from others, and they do so in circumstances in which many
other legal and social consequences follow in train.
That law is in such ways deeply involved in social power will
come as a surprise to few. Marxists, critical legal scholars, and feminists all have noticed it; Foucauldians revel in it. Few, however,
have given enough thought to the ways in which the specific character of law contributes to its power.26 It is not enough to remind us
of the facts of class, hierarchy, patriarchy, or disciplinary regimes.
We also need to know how these express themselves through the
different forms of law and how the legalization of, for instance,
power-conferring rules affects the power distribution in society.
Many other examples exist: laws create classifications, declare statuses, etc. True, these cannot be reduced to the coin of coercion,
but one of the reasons for worrying about coercion, that it is a form
of power, extends also to cases when power is exercised
noncoercively. Thus classification systems and so forth may be productive uses of power: they create subjects, kinds of people, who
then can be regulated in other ways. Of course, the informal social
order does this too, but when productive power becomes imbued
with the authority of law it raises the stakes enormously.
Hart's view about law and power was not at all rosy. He wrote:
"So long as human beings can gain sufficient cooperation from
some to enable them to dominate others, they will use the forms of
law as one of their instruments" (p. 210). But the way the forms of
law interact with social power, both repressively and productively,
is something on which we need a good deal more work.
26. Among the Marxists, only Pashukanis clearly saw that we need an account of law's
specificity as a means of social control.
If ... we forgo an analysis of the fundamental juridical concepts, all we get is a theory
which explains the emergence of legal regulation from the material needs of society, and
thus provides an explanation of the fact that legal norms conform to the material interests of particular social classes. Yet legal regulation itself has still not been analyzed as a
form ....
EvoENY B. PASHUKANis, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY 55 (C. Arthur ed. & B.
Einhorn trans., 1978).
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LAW AND MORALITY

A. Soft Positivism

One important point of clarification in the Postscript is that Hart
now explicitly says that he is a "soft positivist":27 he thinks that
while there may be some legal systems in which the fundamental
test for law is wholly a matter of social fact, there are others in
which it requires moral judgment (p. 250). He only denies that
moral judgments are always required to. know the law.. That, of
course, is to deny Dworkin's central thesis, that the law is whatever
is entailed by the moral and political theory that both fits and best
justifies the legal institutions in question.28
In response to Dworkin's objections to the claim that the rule of
recognition is a matter of "pedigree,"29 Hart says that he never intended to limit its content in this way, that it may go beyond the
mode of creation or adoption of rules and include also among its
criteria both matters of fact not properly thought of as pedigree
(e.g., the substantive constraints of the Sixteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution) and matters not of fact but of moral value
(p. 250). Indeed, he says that this was always his view, and refers
the reader both to the text of The Concept of Law and to an earlier
article in which he claims to "state ... that in some systems of law,
as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity might
explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or substantive moral values, and these may form the content of legal constitutional constraints" (p. 247). Acceptance by the courts and its
reflection in practice is always a necessary element of the rule of
recognition, but what they accept may include moral principles.
The passage that Hart cites in defense of this interpretation of
his earlier work is, however, a reply to the Austinian view that a
supreme lawmaking authority necessarily must be absolute, that it
can make and unmake any law whatever, and that thus there is always an unlimited sovereign behind a legally limited legislature.
Hart draws his important distinction between the presence of an
enforceable duty not to legislate in a certain way - arguably inconsistent with supreme authority - and the absence of a legal power
to legislate in a certain way. Yet this refei::ence is somewhat puzzling if it is supposed to demonstrate Hart's allegiance to soft positivism. On Austin's theory, the sovereign is not to ~e identified
27. The best and most extensive defense of soft positivism is W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLULEGAL PosrrrV!sM (1994). Earlier discussions include Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory,
7 MIDWEST STUD. IN PmL. 223 (1982); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a
Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977).
28. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 87-101.
29. See DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 17.
SIVE
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with the legislature but with whatever body enjoys habitual obedience while not rendering similar obedience to anyone else. Similarly, on Hart's theory the rule of recognition is not to be identified
with the constitution but with the practices of recognition that are
expressed when the constitution is applied. For whether a written
constitution is a source of law is also a question for whose answer
we must turn to the rule of recognition.
Hart describes the rule of recognition as a conventional judicial
rule that identifies certain things as sources of law. But Hart's own
analysis of cases in which a statute is certified as law by the rule of
recognition in fact does not suggest that everything that is required
for a proper application of the statute counts as law. He considers a
case in which the legislature requires an industry to charge only a
"fair rate" for its services (pp. 131-32). Although there will be some
extreme cases of unfairness that clearly are proscribed by the legislation, there will be many more debatable cases that it would be
both impossible and unwise to try to specify in advance. Hart says:
The anticipatable combinations of relevant factors are few, and this
entails a relative indeterminacy in our initial aim of a fair rate ... and
a need for further official choice. In these cases it is clear that the
rule-making authority must exercise a discretion, and there is no possibility of treating the question raised by the various cases as if there
were one uniquely correct answer to be found, as distinct from an
answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting
interests. [pp. 131-32]

Law therefore always must strike some compromise between the
two aims of settling things clearly in advance and leaving room for
later choices in view of the relevant values and contextual facts.
Indeterminacy in law is thus not only an ineliminable feature of language, it is also a desirable element of flexibility.
It is interesting to compare this view about statutory interpretation with what Hart says, above, about constitutions. Hart's analysis is that when a statute leaves it open to an adjudicator to
determine what is "fair," "safe," "reasonable," and so on, it confers
a certain discretion - a choice undetermined by law but open to
reasoned justification. Yet in his new analysis of constitutional provisions referring to "due process" and "freedom of speech," among
others, he imputes the chosen interpretation of those values back
into the law itself, rather than, as his statutory case might suggest, to
the discretionary power of the court. This is Hart's soft positivism.
In reality, the text of The Concept of Law is indecisive as between soft positivism and any harder version. It is understandable
why Hart felt the urge to find in his book precedent for the views
about law and morality that he seemed to hold when he wrote its
Postscript. The fact of the matter, however, is that the distinction
between stronger and weaker versions of the positivist thesis was
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unknown when he wrote the book and was therefore not part of the
polemical context of the time. Properly concerned about the natural lawyers on his right flank, Hart did not anticipate the forces also
gathering on his left.
The resultant ambiguity means that those who endorse stronger
versions of the positivist thesis also can find mucP. of what they
want in The Concept of Law. Resisting Hart's last suggestion, they
can draw from his original text some of the main elements necessary to a unified view of the examples of statutory and constitutional interpretation discussed above. For example, in discussing
the idea of the "sources" of law, Hart comments as follows on the
somewhat blurry distinction between the formal or legal sources of
law, the reason why something counts as valid law, and its material
or historical sources, the cause of its existence:
Where [a judge] considers that no statute or other formal source of
law determines the case before him, he may base his decision on e.g. a
text of the Digest, or the writings of a French jurist. . . . The legal
system does not require him to use these sources, but it is accepted as
perfectly proper that he should do so. They are therefore more than
merely historical or causal influences since such writings are recognized as "good reasons" for decisions. Perhaps we might speak of
such sources as "permissive" legal sources to distinguish them both
from "mandatory" legal or formal sources such as statute and from
historical or material sources. [p. 294]

This suggests that, on Hart's account, something may be a good and
proper reason for a judicial decision in an unregulated case - it
even may be recognized by the courts as such - and yet not be the
law precisely because it is not mandated by a binding source. Here,
of course, Hart presents such a reason as a different "kind" of
source: a "permissive" one. But all we need for a unified account is
the idea that there may be mandatory and permissive aspects to a
single source, and that the law ends where mandatory direction
runs out. And that would give us strong positivism.
Hart's resistance to this, and his attraction to soft positivism,
may, I think, result from embracing a false dilemma: either there is
some kind of logical incoherence in the idea that a rule of recognition could specify moral tests for law, or there is not. If not, then
the most we can say is that such tests would be undesirable. Indeed, this sort of argument pervades Hart's defense of a broad concept of law that includes immoral laws and legal systems over a
narrow one that does not. He argues forcefully that we may and
should distinguish between thinking, for example, that certain legal
systems are wicked, and thinking that they are not legal systems at
all (pp. 207-12). It is conceivable, though profoundly undesirable,
that a legal system might ignore procedural and substantive justice.
The other side of this coin is that it is conceivable, though in a dif-
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ferent way also undesirable, that a legal system might provide wideranging tests of moral rectitude for the validity of law. That appears to be the burden of the following passage:
There is, for me, no logical restriction on the content of the rule of
recognition: so far as "logic" goes it could provide explicitly or implicitly that the criteria determining validity of subordinate laws
should cease to be regarded as such if the laws identified in accordance with them proved to be morally objectionable. So a constitution
could include in its restrictions on the legislative power even of its
supreme legislature not only conformity with due process but a completely general provision that its legal power should lapse if its enactments ever conflicted with principles of morality and justice. The
objection to this extraordinary arrangement would not be "logic" but
the gross indeterminacy of such criteria of legal validity. Constitutions do not invite trouble by taking this form. 3 0

' Since this arrangement is, indeed, not prohibited by "logic," it
may seem that the only important questions are which indeterminacies cause trouble, and how much trouble we can tolerate. Dworkin
complains that if we allow the rule of recognition to be anything
other than a "more or less mechanical test" based on "matters of
social history rather than matters of policy or morality that might be
inherently controversial," then it cannot do what Hart says it does
- namely, cure the uncertainty of a pre-legal, customary regime,31
In reply, Hart says that Dworkin "seems to ... exaggerate both the
degree of certainty which a consistent positivist must attribute to a
body of legal standards and the uncertainty that will result if the
criteria of legal validity include conformity with specific moral principles or values" (p. 251). In any case, he continues, "the exclusion
of all uncertainty at whatever costs in other values is not a goal
which I have ever envisaged for the rule of recognition" (p. 251).
These disputes about whether too much indeterminacy would
flow from a rule of recognition that comprised moral principles are,
however, beside the point. Some moral judgments are more certain, and are subject to broader agreement, than some factual ones.
For instance, it may be more certain that it is wrong to torture innocent children for one's own amusement than it is that a legislature
intended to promote the welfare of children by enacting a certain
statute. The central question, and one that Hart never addresses
here, is whether there might be constraints on a rule of recognition
that are given neither by "logic," that is, by what is conceivable, nor
by what is the most efficient mix of certainty and flexibility.
Consider, for example, the kind of authority that legal rules purport to have. In one of Hart's later papers, he characterizes this as
30. HART, EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at 361.
31. Ronald Dworkin, Reply, in RONALD DwoRKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JurusPRU·
DENCE 247, 247-48 {Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).

May 1996]

The Concept of Law

1709

a claim to provide reasons for acting that are both peremptory that set aside the subject's own assessment of the merits of what is
to be done - and "content-independent" - "intended to function
as a reason independently of the nature or character of the actions
to be done."32 This is not a point of logic. There is nothing in the
meaning of the word "authority," nothing in its logical grammar,
and nothing in the requirements of reason itself to show that legal
authority is understood best in the way Hart suggests. That is a
matter of legal and political theory, not logic. And, even if we
come, as I think we should, to endorse his view of authority, nothing will follow as a matter of sheer logic about the rule of recognition. The motivation for endorsing that view, however, and most
plausible accounts of why content-independent reasons find a place
in practical thought, nonetheless may sit uneasily with the idea that
the rule of recognition can make content-dependent considerations
of morality - the force of which depends precisely on that nature
or character of the actions to be done - part of the law. Indeed,
this is the core of Raz's argument against soft positivism.33 It may
be that those two theses can be reconciled somehow, or that one or
the other should be abandoned. But Hart does neither, and that
leaves his final commitment to soft positivism unstable.
B. Antifunctionalism

Inclusion in the ultimate criteria of legal validity is not the only
way that morality could have a necessary connection to law. Another argument, at least as popular, rests on the purported social
function of law. Lon Fuller, for instance, said that the function Qf
law is to guide human conduct, which it can do only by conforming
to certain procedural principles that he called the "inner morality"
of law.34 Dworkin says that the function of law is to justify the use
of coercion, and thus it must have the features necessary to do
that.35 John Finnis says that the function of law is to coordinate
action for the common good.36 Roger Shiner says that "the judgement of some system of norms that it is a legal system is at one and
the same time a candidate judgement of critical morality that the
system fulfills well some moral purpose."37 Michael Moore says:
"If law is a functional kind then necessarily law serves some good
32. H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in EssAvs ON BENTHAM,
supra note 4, at 243, 254.
33. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 45-52 (1979); Joseph Raz, Authority, Law
and Morality, 68 MoN1sr 295 (1985). The argument receives criticism from a soft-positivist
point of view in WALUCHOW, supra note 27, at 117-40.
34. See LoN FuLI.ER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969).
35. See DwoRKIN, supra note 21, at 93.
36. See JoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
37. ROGER SHINER, NORM AND NATURE 129 (1992).
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and thus, necessarily, law is in that way related to morality."38 In
their different ways, each of these writers finds in functionalism a
link between law and morality.
Hart, while allowing that existing legal systems share a "minimum content" based on what is needed to help secure human survival (pp. 193-200), did not accept any further teleological claims
about law's inherent value. First, as he pointed out in his controversy with Fuller, the functional sense of good, as in a "good screwdriver" is not the same as the moral sense, as in "good person."
Any purposive and rule-governed human practice has certain goods
internal to that practice,39 and this gives rise to a certain objectivity
of language about practice-goods. It follows that just as there may
be an internal morality of law in Fuller's sense, there also may be an
internal morality of murder according to which a good murder is
one that scores high on the functional-excellence scale of murder.
There is no shortage of nonmoral functions of law, from fairly neutral (e.g., guiding behavior) to most troublesome (e.g., elite domination). These functions all may have their internal "moralities," but
none of them establishes a necessary connection between law and
moral value.
Second, even if law has social functions that are deemed, at least
prima facie, morally good (e.g., maintaining order, making justice
possible, etc.), there is but an oblique connection between that and
the claim that a particular legal system has those values. The problem is that something may be a functional kind, and yet have minimal or even no actual capacity to perform its characteristic
function. Take, for instance, a "printer driver." A computer program is a printer driver if and only if it drives the printer. This is a
nearly pure functional kind because it comprises a variety of
software and can be instantiated in a variety of hardware. But what
of a driver that has a bug and thus fails to drive anything? Does it
cease being a printer driver? No, for we know it was designed for
its function and, if fixed, still may perform it. Functional kinds need
have only something like the capacity, when functioning normally,
to perform their functions. So even if the ideal type of law is a
valuable functional kind, this does not guarantee that every legal
system will have some positive worth.
In the Postscript, Hart adds a third and final step to his argument. He denies that law is a functional kind at all. In response to
Dworkin's claim that the function of law is to license the use of
coercive power, Hart writes: "I think it quite vain to seek any more
38. Michael Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY EssAYS 221 (R.P. George ed., 1992).
39. This idea was rediscovered by Alasdair Macintyre. See ALASDAIR MAclNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 175-89 (1981).
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specific purpose which law as such serves beyond providing guides
to human conduct and standards of criticism of such conduct"
(p. 249). The fact that law has such minimal social functions does
not establish that law is a functional kind. For that stronger thesis,
we must also show that the law is distinguished by its functions.
This cannot be done. First, the only universal functions of legal systems are trivial abstractions, such as guiding conduct, maintaining
order, and so on. Second, none of these functions is unique to legal
systems. So, if law is a functional kind, it is a member of the same
kind as, say, "custom" or "morality" or "religion." As Kelsen saw,
all of these systems of norms may have similar ambitions or functions;40 they all may, for instance, prohibit murder. But they can be
distinguished from each other only by their technique. Law is thus a
modal kind and not a functional kind at all; it is distinguished by its
means and not its end. The moral value of law depends primarily
on the ends to which its means are put, and that is a contingent
matter.
Hart's overall message about the relationship between law and
morality is thus in one way similar to Hannah Arendt's in Eichmann in Jerusalem. 41 What made Arendt's book so controversial
was her claim that some Nazi atrocities were not singular, monstrous acts of deeply evil men, but rather the routinized, bureaucratic administration of people as if they were things. Seen from
this point of view, Eichmann was the epitome of law-abidingness.
What Arendt called the "banality of evil" thus may be seen also as
the lawfulness of evil. That is what is so shocking - that law may
be, in a phrase that Fuller derided, "an amoral datum." 42 Some
resist this idea so strongly, and are so intent to preserve the halo
around the procedural virtues of law, that they are prepared to
make its denial an item of faith. In his exchange with Hart, Fuller
said: "I shall have to rest on the assertion of a belief that may seem
naive, namely, that coherence and goodness have more affinity than
coherence and evil."43 That is a faith that Hart, like Arendt, could
not share.

IV. FACTS, VALUES, AND THEORIES
Hart's book sought, as he said in, its preface, "to further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related
40. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 20 (A. Wedberg trans.,
1945); cf. KELSEN, supra note 9, at 60-62.
41. I first realized this on reading Lawrence Douglas's excellent article, The Memory of
Judgment: The Law, the Holocaust, and Denial, HIST. & MEMORY, Fall-Winter 1996, at 100,
107-08.
42. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 636 (1958).
43. Id.
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social phenomena" (p. v). He predicted that lawyers would see his
work as an exercise in "analytical jurisprudence ... concerned with
the clarification of the general framework of legal thought rather
than with the criticism of law or legal policy" (p. v). He also liked
to think of it as "an essay in descriptive sociology" (p. v).
In case it seems obvious that that is what a legal theory should
be, it is worth remembering Dworkin's fundamental disagreement.
According to Dworkin "[j]urisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law."44 At the opening
of Law's Empire the chapter title puts the question "What is law?",
the subtitle asks "Why it Matters," and the first sentence answers:
"It matters how judges decide cases."45 On this point Dworkin
never wavers. That legal theory is about adjudication is not a matter on which he ever had second thoughts. As early as 1965, he
wrote: "What, in general, is a good reason for a decision by a court
of law? This is the question of jurisprudence . . . ."46 Hart, the
antiessentialist, never thought that anything properly could be
called "the question of jurisprudence." The first chapter of The
Concept of Law is entitled "Persistent Questions," in the plural, of
which he identifies three as underlying much of the tradition of argument about the nature of law: How is law related to coercive
threats? What does the obligatory force of law amount to, and how
is it related to moral obligation? What are social rules and in what
way is law about rules? (pp. 6-13). None of these is the question of
jurisprudence, and, interestingly, none of them is Dworkin's
question.
In the Postscript, Hart aims for a peaceful coexistence: Dworkin's question is certainly an important one, and legal reasoning
and the theory of adjudication were topics on which Hart came to
think he should have written more.47 But he insists that there remains a role for what he calls a "general and descriptive" legal theory (pp. 239-40). It is general in that it is not tied to any particular
legal system or culture, and descriptive "in that it is morally neutral
and has no justificatory aims" (p. 240). Hart adds that "it does not
seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms
and structures which appear in my general account of law, though a
clear understanding of these is, I think, an important preliminary to
any useful moral criticism of law" (p. 240).
44. DwoRKIN, supra note 21, at 90.

45. Id. at I.
46. Ronald Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the 71vo-Level Theory
of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640, 640 (1965).
47. For some influential positivist accounts of adjudication and legal reasoning, see especially, NEIL MAcCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978), and RAZ, supra
note 33, at 180-209.
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Is moral neutrality possible in these matters? Here, I think we
are often hampered by a rather sparse vocabulary. Having abandoned a crude distinction between fact and value, it is now commonplace for legal theorists to infer that purported statements of
fact necessarily presuppose or express moral and political positions.
So while we have rejected what Dworkin calls a "fiat distinction
between description and evaluation,"48 we sometimes fall into a
casual identification of the evaluative, the moral, and the political.
. We should avoid this, first by observing the difference between a
description and a statement of a fact. A statement of fact may be
appraised as true or false. A description normally. is not thought of
as being true or false, but as being helpful or unhelpful, illuminating
or unilluminating. There is an infinite number of possible descriptions of any object or state of affairs because there are infinit~ly
many facts about each. A. description of something is thus never a
statement of all the facts about it; it is a selection of those facts that
are taken to be for some purposes important, salient, relevant, interesting, and so on.49 This is not to say that a description is an
appraisal of its object; it is to say that describing is always done
from the point of view of certain values and in that way expresses
those values.
Second, we need to remember that not all" values are moral values. For example, there are the theoretical values of simplicity,
consistency, fecundity, and so on.50 There is also a deep evaluative
substratum to practical thought that begins with reflection about
what is really most salient about the human condition (e.g., the fact
that we can reason or feel pain), and what, though true, is marginal
(e.g., that we are featherless and bipedal). Here begins the realm of
practical value.
An illuminating descriptive account of law will, therefore, implicate values in these two ways. We will be inclined to endorse a
theory that is as simple as its subject matter permits, that is consistent with most of the other views we endorse, and that produces
interesting new hypotheses about and deeper understandings of law
and other related phenomena. Furthermore, because law is part of
human thought and practice, we also will prefer to describe it in an
anthropocentric way, as it relates to those things we take to be most
important about ourselves - the way law embodies power relations that can harm or help people, for instance, rather than its connection to the demand for pulp and paper. In these ways, a general
legal theory must have evaluative aspects, but this stops well short
48. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 148 (1985).
49. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 432-49 (1982).
50. Waluchow calls these "meta-theoretical-evaluative" considerations. See WALUCHow,
supra note 27, at 19-30.
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of the basic features of moral evaluation on any plausible account.
A moral theory will, of course, strive for some similar theoretical
virtues, and any humanistic morality that it systematizes will also
begin from some set of salient facts about the human condition;
however, the characteristic features of moral judgments - identifying basic goods, expressing approval and disapproval, endorsing
universal prescriptions, among others - all involve commitments
well beyond those of description. Thus, while descriptions are not
value-neutral, they need not be morally fraught either.
This is all that Hart needs. Provided that one may describe a
state of affairs without thereby endorsing it, the necessary sort of
neutrality is preserved. That is how we should understand his claim
that "[d]escription may still be a description, even when what is described is an evaluation" (p. 244). None of the familiar arguments
about the theory-ladenness of factual statements, or the valueladenness of descriptions, undermines this idea.
Hart's most powerful argument for a general and descriptive
theory of law, however, is not the soft-positivist one that holds that
a Dworkinian approach is consistent with his own, but rather the
potent claim that Dworkin's theory actually requires something
very like Hart's for its success. Even if we say that moral principles
are part of the law because they are entailed by the theory that best
fits and justifies the legal institutions as a whole, we still need some
way to fix on the relevant institutions in the first place. We can
interpret only an object that we can identify. For this reason,
Dworkin allows that there must be something called "preinterpretive" law:
[T]here must be a "preinterpretive" stage in which the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content are identified .... I enclose "preinterpretive" in quotes because some kind of interpretation
is necessary even at this stage. Social rules do not carry identifying
labels. But a very great degree of consensus is needed - perhaps an
interpretive community is usefully defined as requiring consensus at
this stage - and we may therefore abstract from this stage in our
analysis by presupposing that the classifications it yields are treated as
given in day-to-day reflection and argument.51

Such preinterpretive agreement is, of course, contingent, local, and
open to challenge and change. There must be, however, "enough
initial agreement about what practices are legal practices."52 Fortunately, there is; the boundaries are clear to any lawyer who knows
the craft. Dworkin just insists that lawyers do not learn them by
first sharing a view about what a legal system amounts to, or even
51. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 65-66.
52. Id.
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sharing "common criteria or ground rules" for knowing which facts
about the world are legally relevant.53
These ideas need clarification, for the assertions that there are
boundaries but no shared criteria, social rules but no ground rules,
are obscure. If the point is merely, as Dworkin says, that neither
lay nor professional understandings of law result from having a
good theory in pocket, then there is no dispute. Everyone admits
that the theories arrive late, but what Hart and most other writers
assert, and what Dworkin here seems to deny, is that interesting
things may be said about "preinterpretive" law, about the very
boundaries of legal practice. Dworkin talks of the "consensus,"
"paradigms," and "assumptions" that form preinterpretive law in a
way that suggests that he takes such nodal points of agreement to
be surd, unstructured, facts. Hart, in contrast, thinks they are structured and constructed by conventional social rules. Even if Hart is
wrong about the character of these rules, I think it premature to
conclude that there is no work for theory to do at this level. Can it
really be that a consensus of judgment defies explanation? I am
inclined to say no.
It is, however, a fair question to ask, as students will: "What is
the use of such a theory at such a level of generality?" It is no
response to say: "Well, law is interesting, and we might as well have
a general theory about it." We do need to explain why these deepest, structural questions about our institutions are interesting and
important. Dworkin's answer, that it matters how judges decide
cases, will not help at this level, for little in a general theory of law
tells us how to decide cases. Nor should we, I think, try to hitch the
study to some argument about the value of communing with the
Great Books of legal theory. If a general theory of law is of no real
use, then we might well question the greatness of these books and
direct students to any of the competing bibliographies: Bronte is
always a better read than Bentham. In any case, piety about books
was not Hart's style.
He argued with his predecessors, but refused to encumber the
text with citations. He relegated some modest number of references to the back of the book with instructions that they be read, if
at all, later. (The book would now fail as a tenure piece.) In the
preface, a little diffidently, he justified this decision by referring to
his pedagogical aim:
I hope that this arrangement may discourage the belief that a book on
legal theory is primarily a book from which one learns what other
books contain. So long as this belief is held by those who write, little
progress will be made in the subject; and so long as it is held by those'
53. See id. at 91.
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who read, the educational value of the subject must remain very
small. [p. vi]

Legal theory has a number of legitimate ambitions, and no one
need pursue all of them simultaneously, or even at all. I am sure
that the division of labor is part of what has provoked misunderstanding of Hart's views. Another part is the way this division plays
out in the structure of legal education at least in North America. If
you come to law school with political curiosity but no prior training
in the humanities or social sciences, and are then fed the typical
first-year diet of doctrine, you are bound to arrive at your first legal
theory course aching with hunger. To long for a first chance to debate liberty, justice, or equality and then to be served up the practice theory of rules must be pretty frustrating. All the talk about
general theory being the necessary preliminary to evaluation may
just sound like more excuse for delay.
There is some justice in this reaction, for description is not exactly a preliminary to evaluation. That view is influenced too much
by the old idea of philosophy as underlaborer, clearing away the
muddles .. Description and evaluation intertwine and, ideally, cooperate. Consider Hart's advocacy of a wide concept of law, one including as full-blooded laws those that are immoral. This is not, he
insists, a matter of semantics; we should prefer one concept to the
other only on grounds of theoretical fecundity or of usefulness in
practical judgements (p. 209). But what he says about theoretical
fecundity is brief and question-begging. He thinks it confusing to
separate out iniquitous laws from the rest as "non-laws" because
they have so much structurally in common with laws, and because
no other discipline - such as legal history - has found it profitable to distinguish them so (pp. 209-10). This argument, however,
clearly assumes that the structural features of law are the most central, and that is what is at issue. Nor can we say the broad concept
is strictly necessary for clear practical deliberation. It is true that
matters of political obligation, punishment, and the rule of law raise
complex moral issues. If the rule of law is to be sacrificed in order
that very great evil be punished, then so be it, is Hart's response.s 4
The idea that we may face a choice of evils, however, can be preserved in other ways too. For example, one might say that there is
always a prirna facie moral obligation to obey the law, and also a
prirna facie moral obligation to do justice. The only sure route from
the premise "This is the law" to the conclusion "This must be
54.

A case of retroactive punishment should not be made to look like an ordinary case of
punishment for an act illegal at the time. At least it can be claimed for the simple positivist doctrine that morally iniquitous rules may still be law, that this offers no disguise
for the choice between evils which, in extreme circumstances, may have to be made.
Pp. 211-12.
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obeyed" is one that recognizes no countervailing considerations or
that holds that the obligation to obey is absolute, but those are not
errors inherent to a narrow concept of law. So I don't think that we
are going to justify a general theory of law as a sufficient prophylactic to moral and political obtuseness.
The main interest in a general theory of law, I think, rests in the
way that it helps us understand our institutions and, through them,
our culture. It is only when we move beyond the question of how
to decide cases, and even beyond the casuistry of applied ethics,
that we begin to appreciate the role of a general theory. What is
law that people take such pride in it? Is law a good idea? How and
to whom do legal institutions distribute power? Is the rule of law
always desirable? Can it help achieve justice? What might we gain,
or lose, by limiting the reach of law? Those are deep and urgent
questions for political theory, and also for political practice. Anyone who wants answers to them will need the help of a general
theory of law. That Hart made such a good start on it is, for us,
extremely lucky.

